its clearest and only unequivocal symptom, is merel arrangement, which borrows its methods of intimida of organization and its instruments of violence f known political arsenal of tyranny, despotism and d and owes its existence only to the deplorable, bu dental failure of the traditional political forces-l servative, national or socialist, republican or monarc tarian or democratic. Or whether, on the contrary, thing as the nature of totalitarian government, whe own essence and can be compared with and defi forms of government such as Western thought h recognized since the times of ancient philosophy.
Questions of this sort have been out of fashion f and for reasons which may have more than a litt those modern developments which eventually br crisis of Western politics no less than of Western po More specifically, such questions have been thought if not meaningless, ever since the social sciences est rule over the whole field of politics and history. Inte development, which easily can be traced back to M sociology from its beginnings showed a marked t plain political institutions and historical developmen psychological types; all the well-known cliches of th classes, the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia have alre ticular tinge of typification which shows itself open such as "the authoritarian personality." More rece growing disappointment in the strictly Marxist expla tory, psychology itself with its new Freudian conce ego, father-image, and oedipus complex, has inva sciences and continues to provide them with their c "evaluation" to such an extent that it has become difficult to tell the two sciences from each other.
This new-fangled mixture of sociology and psychology is no accident. Both sciences have their origin in a liberalism that viewed politics (and more or less all hunlan affairs) under the dual category of society and individual. Men became mere parts of a society that conditioned or determined the individuals, as the whole determines its parts. In this sense, sociology and psychology have always been two sides of the same medal, the one dealing with IDEOLOGY AND TERROR the functioning of the whole (society), the other with the tioning of the parts (individuals). The trouble came wh chology, notwithstanding its respect for society, discovered tha these individuals, whose whole interior life was supposed to ditioned by, or to react against, social circumstances, p "soul." But we have souls only as long as we are more th members of society where this psychological side of our b always created disturbances. Manners and conventions, a morals and mores help us to control our souls so that we ca tion on a merely social level. Individual psychology, since i on man as though he were nothing but an individual part of has developed into a science which deals mostly with abnor havior patterns: all "psychological" attitudes become a when they occur in society because they have been strippe privacy in which alone a man's soul can function "normall dividual psychology became fashionable wherever custo conventions, the whole texture of morality which is the l of society, lost their authority. The modern individual is viving member of a society which no longer exists; it is a p lost its place in the whole. In this situation, the psych sciences have become increasingly social-minded and dir greatest efforts toward the re-adjustment of isolated indi The trouble is that society as a whole, that is, as something greater than the sum total of its parts, no longer exists. T demonstration of this is that the social sciences can conceive ciety now only in terms of individual behavior patterns, wh indiscriminately apply to collective bodies where such never occurs.
The great merit of this confusion is that it someh awakened us to the fact that political bodies, to quot forgotten remark of Plato, do not spring from oak and ro viii, 544D) Yet, they do not spring from within our p and individual selves either. The old Roman distinction between res publica and res privata is still valid. Political forms of organization concern matters which are of equal concern to each of us because they occur between us. Our question whether there is such a thing as the nature of totalitarian domination means actually whether the entirely new and unprecedented forms of totalitarian organization and course of action rest on one of the few basic experiences which men can make whenever th gether, and are concerned with public affairs. If the experience which finds its political expression in totalit ination, then, in view of the novelty of the totalitarian government, this must be an experience which, for wh son, has never before served as the foundation of a b and whose general mood-although it may be familia other respect-never before has pervaded, and directe dling of, public affairs.
If we consider this in terms of the history of ideas, extremely unlikely. For the forms of government u men live have been very few; they were discovered early by the Greeks and have proved extraordinarily longapply these findings, whose fundamental idea, despite m tions, did not change in the two and a half thousand separate Plato from Kant, we are tempted at once to totalitarianism as some modern form of tyranny, that government where power is wielded by one man. A power, unrestricted by law, yielded in the interest of th hostile to the interests of the governed, on one hand, f principle of action, namely fear of the people by th fear of the ruler by the people, on the other-these hav hallmarks of tyranny throughout our tradition.
Instead of saying that totalitarian government is dented, we could also say that it has exploded the very on which all definitions of the essence of governments based in political philosophy, that is the alternative bet ful and lawless government, between arbitrary and power. That lawful government and legitimate pow side, lawlessness and arbitrary power on the other, b gether and were inseparable has never been questio totalitarian rule confronts us with a totally different k ernment. It defies, it is true, all positive laws, even to t of defying those which it has itself established (as i of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, to quote only th standing example) or which it did not care to abolis case of the Weimar Constitution which the Nazi govern revoked). But it operates neither without guidance is it arbitrary, for it claims to obey strictly and unequiv laws of Nature or of History from which all posit have been supposed to spring.
It is the monstrous, yet seemingly unanswe totalitarian rule that, far from being "lawless sources of authority from which positive laws rec mate legitimation, that far from being arbitrary ent to these suprahuman forces than any gover before, and that far from wielding its power in th man, it is quite prepared to sacrifice everybody's v interests to the execution of what it assumes to be the law of History or the law of Nature. Its defiance of positive laws claims to be a higher form of legitimacy which, since it is inspired the sources themselves, can do away with petty legality. Tota tarian lawfulness pretends to have found a way to establish t rule of justice on earth-something which the legality of positive law admittedly could never attain. The discrepancy between legality and justice could never be bridged because the standar of right and wrong into which positive law translates its ow source of authority-"natural law" governing the whole universe, or divine law revealed in human history or customs and traditio expressing the law common to the sentiments of all men-are nec essarily general and must be valid for a countless and unpredictable number of cases, so that each concrete individual case wi its unrepeatable set of circumstances somehow escapes it Totalitarian lawfulness, defying legality and pretending t establish the direct reign of justice on earth, executes the law of History or of Nature without translating it into standards of rig and wrong for individual behavior. It applies the law directly mankind without bothering with the behavior of men. The l of Nature or the law of History, if properly executed, is expect to produce mankind as its end product; and this expectation l behind the claim to global rule of all totalitarian governmen Totalitarian policy claims to transform the human species into a active unfailing carrier of a law to which human beings otherwi would only passively and reluctantly be subjected. If it is tr that the link between totalitarian countries and the civilized world was broken through the monstrous crimes of totalitarian regim it is also true that this criminality was not due to simple aggres siveness, ruthlessness, warfare and treachery, but to a consci break of that consensus iuris which, according to Ci a "people," and which, as international law, in mo constituted the civilized world insofar as it remains the foundationstone of international relations even under the conditions of war.
Both moral judgment and legal punishment presuppose this basic consent; the criminal can be judged justly only because he takes part in the consensus iuris, and even the revealed law of God can function among men only when they listen and consent to it.
At this point the fundamental difference between the totalitarian and all other concepts of law comes to light. Totalitarian policy does not replace one set of laws with another, does not establish its own consensus iuris, does not create, by one revolution, a new form of legality. Its defiance of all, even its own positive laws implies that it believes it can do without any consensus iuris whatever, and still not resign itself to the tyrannical state of lawlessness, arbitrariness and fear. It can do without the consensus iuris because it promises to release the fulfillment of law from all action and will of man; and it promises justice on earth because it claims to make mankind itself the embodiment of the law.
This identification of man and law, which seems to cancel the discrepancy between legality and justice that has plagued lega thought since ancient times, has nothing in common with th lumen naturale or the voice of conscience, by which Nature o Divinity as the sources of authority for the ius naturale or th historically revealed commands of God, are supposed to announce their authority in man himself. This never made man a walki embodiment of the law, but on the contrary remained distin from him as the authority which demanded consent and obed ence. Nature or Divinity as the source of authority for positi laws are thought of as permanent and eternal; positive laws were changing and changeable according to circumstances, but the possessed a relative permanence as compared with the much mor rapidly changing actions of men; and they derived this perm nence from the eternal presence of their source of authority. Pos tive laws, therefore, are primarily designed to function as stabiliz ing factors for the ever changing movements of men. In the interpretation of totalitarianism, all laws have become laws of movement. When the Nazis talked about the law of Natur or when the Bolsheviks talk about the law of History nor History is any longer the stabilizing source of the actions of mortal men; they are movements Underlying the Nazis' belief in race laws as the exp law of Nature in man, is Darwin's idea of man as a natural development which does not necessarily present species of human beings, just as under t belief in class-struggle as the expression of the law Marx's notion of society as the product of a gig movement which races according to its own law of end of historical times when it will abolish itself.
The difference between Marx's historical and Darwin's naturalistic approaches has frequently been pointed out, usually and rightly in favor of Marx. This has led us to forget the great and positive interest Marx took in Darwin's theories; Engels could not think of a greater compliment to Marx's scholarly achievemen than to call him the "Darwin of history." If one considers, n the actual achievement but, the basic philosophies of both me it turns out that ultimately the movement of History and th movement of Nature are one and the same. Darwin's introduction of the concept of development into nature, his insistence that, at least in the field of biology, natural movement is not circular but unilinear, moving in an infinitely progressing direction, means in fact that nature is, as it were, being swept into history, that natural life is considered to be historical. The "natural" law of the survival of the fittest is just as much a historical law and could be used as such by racism as Marx's law of the survival of the most progressive class. Marx's class struggle, on the other hand, as the driving force of history is only the outward expression of the development of productive forces which in turn have their origin in the labor force of men. Labor, according to Marx, is not a historical but a natural-biological "force," namely man's "metabolism with nature" by which he conserves his individual life and reproduces the species. Engels saw the affinity between the basic convictions of the two men very clearly because he understood the decisive role which the concept of development played in both theories. The tremendous intellectual change which took place in the middle of the last century consisted in the refusal to view or accept anything "as it is" and in the consistent interpreta-tion of everything as being only a stage of some further ment. Whether the driving force of this development w nature or history is relatively secondary.
In these theories, the term "law" itself changed its m from expressing the framework of stability within whic actions and motions can take place, it became the expr the motion itself.
II
By lawful government we understand a body politic in positive laws are needed to translate and realize the im ius naturale or the eternal commandments of God into standards of right and wrong. Only in these standards, in the body of positive laws of each country, do the ius naturale or the Commandments of God achieve their political reality. In the body politic of totalitarian government, this place of positive laws is taken by total terror, which is designed to translate into reality the law of movement of History or Nature. Just as positive laws, though they define transgressions, are independent of them-the absence of crimes in any society does not render laws superfluous but, on the contrary, signifies their most perfect rule-so terror in totalitarian government has ceased to be a mere means for the suppression of opposition, though it is also used for such purposes. Terror becomes total when it becomes independent of all opposition; it rules supreme when nobody any longer stands in its way. If lawfulness is the essence of non-tyrannical government and lawlessness is the essence of tyranny, then terror is the essence of totalitarian domination.
Terror is the realization of the law of movement; its chief aim is to make it possible for the force of Nature or of History to race freely through mankind, unhindered by any spontaneous human action. As such, terror seeks to "stabilize" men in order to liberate the forces of Nature or History. It is this movement which singles out the foes of mankind against whom terror is let loose, and no free action of either opposition or sympathy can be permitted to interfere with the elimination of the "objective enemy" of History or Nature, of the class or the race. Guilt and innocence become senseless notions; "guilty" is he who stands in the way of the natural or historical process which has passed judgment over "inferior races," over individuals "unfit to live classes and decadent peoples." Terror executes th and before its court, all concerned are subjectively murdered because they did nothing against the s murderers because they do not really murder but e sentence pronounced by some higher tribunal. Th selves do not claim to be just or wise, but only torical or natural laws; they do not apply laws, movement in accordance with its inherent law. Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of the movement of some suprahuman force Nature or History.
Terror as the execution of a law of movement whose ultimate goal is not the welfare of men or the interest of one man but the fabrication of mankind, eliminates individuals for the sake of the species, sacrifices the "parts" for the sake of the "whole." The suprahuman force of Nature or History has its own beginning and its own end, so that it can be hindered only by the new beginning and the individual end which the life of each man actually is.
Positive laws in constitutional government are designed to erect boundaries and establish channels of communication between men whose community is continually endangered by the new men born into it. With each new birth, a new beginning is born into the world, a new world has potentially come into being. The stability of the laws corresponds to the constant motion of all human affairs, a motion which can never end as long as men are born and die. The laws hedge in each new beginning and at the same time assure its freedom of movement, the potentiality of something entirely new and unpredictable; the boundaries of positive laws are for the political existence of man what memory is for his historica existence: they guarantee the pre-existence of a common world the reality of some continuity which transcends the individual life span of each generation, absorbs all new origins and is nourished by them.
Total terror is so easily mistaken for a symptom of tyrannical government because totalitarian government in its initial stages must behave like a tyranny and raze the boundaries of man-made law. But total terror leaves no arbitrary lawlessness behind it and does not rage for the sake of some arbitrary will or for the sake of despotic power of one man against all, least of all for the sake of a war of all against all. It substitutes for the channels of communication between individual men a band of iron which holds them so tightly together that it is as though t plurality had disappeared into One Man of gigantic dimensi To abolish the fences of laws between men-as tyranny do means to take away man's liberties and destroy freedom as a li ing political reality; for the space between men as it is hedged by laws, is the living space of freedom. Total terror uses this instrument of tyranny but destroys at the same time also the l less, fenceless wilderness of fear and suspicion which tyra leaves behind. This desert, to be sure, is no longer a living s of freedom, but it still provides some room for the fear-gu movements and suspicion-ridden actions of its inhabitants.
By pressing men against each other, total terror destroys t space between them; compared to the condition within its band, even the desert of tyranny, insofar as it is still some ki of space, appears like a guarantee of freedom. Totalitarian g ernment does not just curtail liberties or abolish essential f doms; nor does it, at least to our limited knowledge, succee eradicating the love for freedom from the hearts of man. It d stroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is sim the capacity of motion which cannot exist without space. Total terror, the essence of totalitarian government, ex neither for nor against men. It is supposed to provide the forc of Nature or History with an incomparable instrument to a erate their movement. This movement, proceeding accordin its own law, cannot in the long run be hindered; eventually force will always prove more powerful than the most powe forces engendered by the actions and the will of men. But it c be slowed down and is slowed down almost inevitably by freedom of man, which even totalitarian rulers cannot deny, f this freedom-irrelevant and arbitrary as they may deem identical with the fact that men are being born and that theref each of them is a new beginning, begins, in a sense, the w anew. From the totalitarian point of view, the fact that men a born and die can be only regarded as an annoying interfer with higher forces. Terror, therefore, as the obedient servant natural or historical movement has to eliminate from the proc not only freedom in any specific sense, but the very sourc freedom which is given with the fact of the birt resides in his capacity to make a new beginning. band of terror, which destroys the plurality of m out of many the One who unfailingly will act as tho self were part of the course of History or Nature been found not only to liberate the historical and na but to accelerate them to a speed they never would to themselves. Practically speaking, this means tha cutes on the spot the death sentences which Natu to have pronounced on races or individuals who a While under present conditions totalitarian domination still shares with other forms of government the need for a guide for the behavior of its citizens in public affairs, it does not need and could not even use a principle of action strictly speaking, since it will eliminate precisely the capacity of man to act. Under conditions of total terror not even fear can any longer serve as an advisor of how to behave, because terror chooses its victims without reference to individual actions or thoughts, exclusively in accordance with the objective necessity of the natural or historical process. Under totalitarian conditions, fear probably is more widespread than ever before; but fear has lost its practical usefulness when actions guided by it can no longer help to avoid the dangers man fears. The same is true for sympathy or support of the regime; for total terror not only selects its victims according to objective standards; it chooses its executioners with as complete a disregard as possible for the candidate's conviction and sympathies. The consistent elimination of conviction as a motive for action has become a matter of record since the great purge Soviet Russia and the satellite countries. The aim of totalitarian education has never been to instill convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any. The introduction of purely objective cri teria into the selective system of the SS troops was Himmler' great organizational invention; he selected the photographs according to purely racial criteri decided, not only who was to be eliminated, but be trained as an executioner.
No guiding principle of behavior, taken itself from the realm of human action, such as virtue, honor, fear, is necessary or can be useful to set into motion a body politic which no longer us terror as a means of intimidation, but whose essence is terror. In its stead, it has introduced an entirely new principle into publ affairs that dispenses with human will to action altogether an appeals to the craving need for some insight into the law of movement according to which the terror functions and upon which therefore, all private destinies depend.
The inhabitants of a totalitarian country are thrown into and caught in the process of Nature or History for the sake of accelerat ing its movement; as such, they can only be executioners or victim of its inherent law. The process may decide that those who today eliminate races and individuals or the members of dying classes an decadent peoples are tomorrow those who must be sacrificed. Wh totalitarian rule needs to guide the behavior of its subjects is preparation to fit each of them equally well for the role of execu tioner and the role of victim. This two-sided preparation, the sub stitute for a principle of action, is the ideology.
III
Ideologies-isms which to the satisfaction of their adher can explain everything and every occurrence by deducing it f a single premise-are a very recent phenomenon and, for m decades, this played a negligible role in political life. Only the wisdom of hindsight can we discover in them certain elem which have made them so disturbingly useful for totalitarian Not before Hitler and Stalin were the great political potentiali of the ideologies discovered.
Ideologies are known for their scientific character: they co bine the scientific approach with results of philosophical relev and pretend to be scientific philosophy. The word "ideolo seems to imply that an idea can become the subject matter science just as animals are the subject matter of zoology, and t the suffix -logy in ideology, as in zoology, indicates nothingbu logoi, the scientific statements made on it. If this ideology would indeed be a pseudo-science and a pseu transgressing at the same time the limitations of sci limitations of philosophy. Deism, for example, would ideology which treats the idea of God, with which concerned, in the scientific manner of theology for w revealed reality. (A theology which is not based on r given reality but treats God as an idea would b zoology which is no longer sure of the physical, tangib animals.) Yet we know that this is only part of the t though it denies divine revelation, does not simply tific" statements on a God which is only an "idea, idea of God in order to explain the course of the "ideas" of isms-race in racism, God in deism, etc the subject matter of the ideologies and the suffixdicates simply a body of "scientific" statements.
An ideology is quite literally what its name indica logic of an idea. Its subject matter is history to whic is applied; the result of this application is not a b ments about something that is, but the unfolding which is in constant change. The ideology treats t events as though it followed the same "law" as t position of its "idea." Ideologies pretend to know of the whole historical process-the secrets of the tricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the f of the logic inherent in their respective ideas.
Ideologies are never interested in the miracle of are historical, concerned with becoming and perish rise and fall of cultures, even if they try to expla some "law of nature." The word "race" in racism does not signify any genuine curiosity about the human races as a f for scientific exploration, but is the "idea" by which the mo ment of history is explained as one consistent process.
The "idea" of an ideology is neither the eternal essen grasped by the eyes of the mind nor the regulator of reason-a was from Plato to Kant-but has become an instrument of explanation. To an ideology, history does not appear in the light of an idea (which would imply that history is seen sub specie of some ideal eternity which itself is beyond historical motion) but as something which can be calculated by it. What into this new role is its own "logic," that is a mov is the consequence of the "idea" itself and needs no o to set it into motion. Racism is the belief that there is a motion inherent in the very "idea" of race, just as deism is the belief that a motion is inherent in the very notion of God.
The movement of history and the logical process of this notion are supposed to correspond to each other, so that whatever happens, happens according to the logic of one "idea." However, the only possible movement in the realm of logic is the process of deduction from a premise. Dialectical logic, with its process from thesis through antithesis to synthesis which in turn becomes the thesis of the next dialectical movement is not different in principle, once an ideology gets hold of it; the first thesis becomes the premise and its advantage for ideological explanation is that this dialectical device can explain away factual contradictions as stages of one identical, consistent movement.
As soon as logic as a movement of thought-and not as a necessary control of thinking-is applied to an idea, this idea is transformed into a premise. Ideological world explanations performed this operation long before it became so eminently fruitful for totalitarian reasoning. The purely negative coercion of logic, the prohibition of contradictions, became "productive" so that a whole line of thought could be initiated, and forced upon the mind, by drawing conclusions in the manner of mere argumentation. This argumentative process could be interrupted neither by a new idea (which would have been another premise with a different set of consequences) nor by a new experience. Ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction. The danger in exchanging the necessary insecurity of philosophical thought for the total explanation of an ideology and its Weltanschauung, is not even so much the risk of falling for some usually vulgar, always uncritical assumption as of exchanging the freedom inherent in man's capacity to think for the straightjacket of logic with which man can force himself almost as violently as he is forced by some outside power.
The transformation of an idea into a premise a the logic of deduction as only demonstration for tainly only one of the totalitarian elements in ideo is obviously the claim of all Weltanschauungen to o planations of everything, mainly, of course, of pas future. And the emancipation from reality this implies, since it pretends to know beforehand ever perience may still have in store, might, psychologi be even more important. Yet, we insisted on this p ity of ideologies because the true totalitarian rul Stalin, not their forerunners) used it more than ment when they converted ideologies-racism and th the law of nature, or dialectical materialism and the law of history-into foundation stones for the n body politic.
The device both totalitarian rulers used to transform their respective ideologies into weapons with which each of their subjects would force himself into step with the terror movement was deceptively simple and inconspicuous: they took them dead seriously, took pride the one in his supreme gift for "ice cold reasoning" (Hitler) and the other in the "mercilessness of his dialectics," and proceeded to drive ideological implications into extremes of logical consistency which, to the onlooker, looked preposterously "primitive" and absurd: a "dying class" consisted of people condemned to death; races that are "unfit to live" were to be exterminated. Whoever agreed that there are such things as "dying classes" and did not draw the consequence of killing their members, or that the right to live had something to do with race and did not draw the consequence of killing "unfit races," was plainly either stupid or a coward. This stringent logicality as a guide to action permeates the whole structure of totalitarian movements and governments. It is exclusively the work of Hitler and Stalin who, although they did not add a single new thought to the ideas and propaganda slogans of their movements, for this reason alone must be considered ideologists of the greatest importance.
What distinguished these new totalitarian ideologists from their predecessors was that it was no longer primarily the "idea" of the ideology-the struggle of classes and the exploitation of the workers or the struggle of races and the care for Germanic peoples-which appealed to them, but the logic could be developed from it. According to Stalin, n nor the oratory but "the irresistible force of l overpowered (Lenin's) audience." The power thought was born when the idea seized the ma covered to reside, not in the idea itself, but in its which "like a mighty tentacle seizes you on all and from whose grip you are powerless to tear yo must either surrender or make up your mind t (Stalin's speech of January 28, 1924; quoted from Works, vol. I, p. 33, Moscow, 1947.) Only when of the ideological aims, the classless society or t were at stake, could this force show itself. In realization, the original substance upon which the themselves as long as they had to appeal to the ploitation of the workers or the national aspiratio is gradually lost, devoured as it were by the p perfect accordance with "ice cold reasoning" and t force of logic," the workers lost under Bolshevik rights they had been granted under Tsarist opp German people suffered a kind of warfare which slightest regard to the minimum requirements fo German nation. It is in the nature of ideologica not simply a betrayal committed for the sake of s lust for power-that the real content of the ideolo class or the Germanic peoples), which original about the "idea" (the struggle of classes as the la the struggle of races as the law of nature), is d logic with which the "idea" is carried out.
The preparation of victims and executioners rianism requires in place of Montesquieu's princ not the ideology itself-racism or dialectical ma inherent logicality. The most persuasive argument an argument of which Hitler like Stalin was ve can't say A without saying B and C and so on, of the murderous alphabet. Here, the coercive for seems to have its source; it springs from our fear ourselves. To the extent that the Bolshevik pu making its victims confess to crimes they neve relies chiefly on this basic fear and argues as follow agreed on the premise that history is a struggle of cla the role of the Party in its conduct. You know the historically speaking, the Party is always right (in t Trotsky: "We can only be right with and by the Par tory has provided no other way of being in the righ historical moment, that is in accordance with the law certain crimes are due to be committed which the Par the law of History, must punish. For these crimes, the criminals; it may be that the Party, though knowing t does not quite know the criminals; more important sure about the criminals is to punish the crimes, becau such punishment, History will not be advanced but hindered in its course. You, therefore, either have com crimes or have been called by the Party to play the criminal-in either case, you have objectively becom of the Party. If you don't confess, you cease to he through the Party, and have become a real enemy.-T force of the argument is: if you refuse, you contradic and, through this contradiction, render your whole lif less; the A which you said dominates your whole life t consequences of B and C which it logically engender Totalitarian rulers rely on the compulsion with whi compel ourselves, for the limited mobilization of p even they still need; this inner compulsion is the tyran ality against which nothing stands but the great capac to start something new. The tyranny of logicality beg mind's submission to logic as a never-ending process, on relies in order to engender his thoughts. By this su surrenders his inner freedom as he surrenders his freedom of movement when he bows down to an outward tyranny. Freedom as an inner capacity of man is identical with the capacity to begin just as freedom as a political reality is identical with a space movement between men. Over the beginning, no logic, no cogent deduction can have any power, because its chain presupposes, the form of a premise, the beginning. As terror is needed le with the birth of each new human being a new beginning ari and raise its voice in the world, so the self-coercive force of logicality is mobilized lest anybody ever start thinking-which as the freest and purest of all human activities is the very of the compulsory process of deduction. Totalitarian go can be safe only to the extent that it can mobilize will power in order to force him into that gigantic mo History or Nature which supposedly uses mankind as it and knows neither birth nor death.
The compulsion of total terror on one side, which, with its iron band, presses masses of isolated men together and ,upports them in a world which has become a wilderness for them, and the self-coercive force of logical deduction on the other, which prepares each individual in his lonely isolation against all others, correspond to each other and need each other in order to set the terror-ruled movement into motion and keep it moving. Just as terror, even in its pre-total, merely tyrannical form ruins all relationships between men, so the self-compulsion of ideological thinking ruins all relationships with reality. The preparation has succeeded when-people have lost contact with their fellow men as well as the reality around them; for together with these contacts, men lose the capacity of both experience and thought. The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e., the reality of experience) and the distinction between true and false (i.e., the standards of thought) no longer exist.
IV
The question we raised at the start of these considerations and to which we now return is what kind of basic experience in the living-together of men permeates a form of government whose essence is terror and whose principle of action is the logicality of ideological thinking. That such a combination was never used before in the varied forms of political domination is obvious. Still, the basic experience on which it rests must be human and known to men, insofar as even this most "original" of all political bodies has been devised by, and is somehow answering the needs of, men.
It has frequently been observed that terror can rule absolutely only over men who are isolated against each other and that, therefore, one of the primary concerns of all tyrannical govern-ment is to bring this isolation about. Isolation may be ning of terror; it certainly is its most fertile ground; it result. This isolation is, as it were, pretotalitarian; its impotence insofar as power always comes from men gether, "acting in concert" (Burke); isolated men ar by definition.
Isolation and impotence, that is the fundamental act at all, have always been characteristic of tyrann contacts between men are severed in tyrannical govern the human capacities for action and power are frus not all contacts between men are broken and not all human capacities destroyed. The whole sphere of private life wi capacities for experience, fabrication and thought are left in
We know that the iron band of total terror leaves no spa such private life and that the self-coercion of totalitarian destroys man's capacity for experience and thought just a tainly as his capacity for action.
What we call isolation in the political sphere, is called l ness in the sphere of social intercourse. Isolation and lon world whose chief values are dictated by labor, t human activities have been transformed into l such conditions, only the sheer effort of labor whi to keep alive is left and the relationship with human artifice is broken. Isolated man who lost political realm of action is deserted by the wo well, if he is no longer recognized as homo fabe an animal laborans whose necessary "metabolism of concern to no one. Isolation then becomes loneli based on isolation generally leaves the product man intact; a tyranny over "laborers," however the rule over slaves in antiquity, would automa over lonely, not only isolated, men and tend to While isolation concerns only the political realm liness concerns human life as a whole. Totalitari like all tyrannies, certainly could not exist withou public realm of life, that is, without destroying, b their political capacities. But totalitarian dominatio government is new in that it is not content with t destroys private life as well. It bases itself on lo experience of not belonging to the world at all, the most radical and desperate experiences of man Loneliness, the common ground for terror, the talitarian government, and for ideology or logicali tion of its executioners and victims, is closely con rootedness and superfluousness which have bee modern masses since the beginning of the indu and have become acute with the rise of imperia of the last century and the break-down of polit and social traditions in our own time. To be up have no place in the world, recognized and guaran to be superfluous means not to belong to the w rootedness can be the preliminary condition for s just as isolation can (but must not) be the prelim for loneliness. Taken in itself, without considerati historical causes and its new role in politics, lon same time contrary to the basic requirements of th tion and one of the fundamental experiences of ev Even the experience of the materially and sensu depends upon my being in contact with other men common sense which regulates and controls all other without which each of us would be enclosed in his ow larity of sense data which in themselves are unreliable erous. Only because we have common sense, that is on not one man, but men in the plural inhabit the ear trust our immediate sensual experience. Yet, we have on mind ourselves that one day we shall have to leave th world which will go on as before and for whose con are superfluous in order to realize loneliness, the ex being abandoned by everything and everybody.
Loneliness is not solitude. Solitude requires being alon as loneliness shows itself most sharply in company w Apart from a few stray remarks-usually framed in a p mood like Cato's statement (reported by Cicero, De R I, 17): numquam minus solum esse quam cum solus es was he less alone than when he was alone," or never was he less lonely than when he was in solitude-it seems that Epictetus, the emancipated slave philosopher of Greek origin, was the first to distinguish between loneliness and solitude. His discovery, in a way, was accidental, his chief interest being neither solitude nor loneliness, but being alone (monos) in the sense of absolute independence. As Epictetus sees it (Dissertationes, Book 3, ch. 13) the lonely man (eremos) finds himself surrounded by others with whom he cannot establish contact or to whose hostility he is exposed. The solitary man, on the contrary, is alone and therefore "can be together with himself" since men have the capacity of "talking with themselves." In solitude, in other words, I am "by myself," together with my self, and therefore two-in-one, whereas in loneliness I am actually one, deserted by all others.
All thinking, strictly speaking, is done in solitude and is a dialogue between me and myself; but this dialogue of the two-in-one does not lose contact with the world of my fellow-men because they are represented in the self with whom I lead the dialogue of thought. The problem of solitude is that this two-in-one needs the others in order to become one again: one unchangeable individual whose identity can never be mistaken for that of any other. For the confirmation of my identity I depend entirely upon other people; and it is the great saving grace of companionship for the dialogue of thought in which one remains alw restores the identity which makes them speak w voice of one unexchangeable person.
Solitude can become loneliness; this happens when self I am deserted by my own self. Solitary me been in danger of loneliness, when they can no l redeeming grace of companionship to save them fr equivocality and doubt. Historically, it seems as danger became sufficiently great to be noticed by corded by history only in the nineteenth century.
clearly when philosophers, for whom alone solitu life and a condition of work, were no longer con fact that "philosophy is only for the few" and bega nobody "understands" them. Characteristic in thi anecdote reported from Hegel's deathbed which have been told of any great philosopher before has understood me except one; and he also misun versely, there is always the chance that a lonely man and starts the thinking dialogue of solitude. Thi happened to Nietzsche in Sils Maria when he con thustra. In two poems ("Sils Maria" and "Aus ho he tells of the empty expectation and the yearning lonely until suddenly "um Mittag wars, da wurde E Nun feiern wir, vereinten Siegs gewiss,! das Fe Freund Zarathustra kam, der Gast der Gdste when One became Two . . . Certain of united vi brate the feast of feasts; friend Zarathustra cam guests.") What makes loneliness so unbearable is the loss of one's own self which can be realized in solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the trusting and trustworthy company of my equa In this situation, man loses trust in himself as the partner of h thoughts and that elementary confidence in the world which necessary to make experiences at all. Self and world, capacit for thought and experience are lost at the same time.
The only capacity of the human mind which needs neithe the self nor the other nor the world in order to function safely and which is as independent of experience as it is of thinking to confirm a man's identity outside all relationships It fits him into the iron band of terror even whe and totalitarian domination tries never to leave him in the extreme situation of solitary confinement. By space between men and pressing men against each ot productive potentialities of isolation are annihilat ing and glorifying the logical reasoning of loneliness knows that he will be utterly lost if ever he lets go premise from which the whole process is being start slim chances that loneliness may be transformed and logic into thought are obliterated.
If it is true that tyranny bears the germs of its tion because it is based upon powerlessness which is of man's political condition, then, one is tempted downfall of totalitarian domination without outside because it rests on the one human experience whic tion of man's social condition. Yet, even if this a valid-and there are reasons to doubt it-it would after the full realization of totalitarian government sible only after the conquest of the earth.
Apart from such considerations-which as predi little avail and less consolation-there remains the fact that the crisis of our time and its central experience have brought forth an entirely new form of government which as a potentiality and an ever-present danger is only too likely to stay with us from now on, just as other forms of government which came about at different historical moments and rested on different fundamental experiences have stayed with mankind regardless of temporary defeats-monarchies, and republics, tyrannies, dictatorships and despotism.
But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only "message" which the end can ever produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of man; politically, it is identical with man's freedom. Initium ut esset homo creatus est-"that a beginning be made man was created" said Augustine. (Civitas Dei, Book 12, ch. 20) This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man.
